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In recent years, Huawei Technologies Inc. has become one of 
the most powerful telecommunication companies in the world.  
While it has been very successful, it has been surrounded 
by controversy.  The United States has presented multiple 
accusations against Huawei; however, the supporting 
evidence is often lacking.  This thesis examines the U.S. 
strategic implications of Huawei’s expansion into Latin 
America.  First, the U.S. economic impact of this expansion 
is examined.  Next, the security concerns posed by Huawei 
and accusations of espionage, intellectual property 
infringement, and an inappropriate relationship with Iran 
are evaluated.  These accusations are then evaluated for 
validity based on the evidence presented.  Finally, these 
findings are summarized and multiple future recommendations 
for research and actions are presented.  Since there is 
little evidence to support many of the accusations against 
Huawei, it is essential to either find such evidence, or 
drop these claims. 
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I. THE LONG-TERM U.S. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
HUAWEI’S PENETRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
One of the most important concerns of any nation is 
security.  A nation’s security can be threatened in many 
ways by many different adversaries.  This thesis will 
address one simple example of a security threat.  What are 
the long-term strategic implications of Chinese 
telecommunications penetration into Latin America?  While 
there are multiple examples of Chinese companies, this case 
study will focus on Huawei Technologies Incorporated. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of this work can be illustrated by 
addressing two framing questions.  First, why should the 
U.S. care about Latin America?  Second, why should the U.S. 
care about Huawei’s activities?  This section addresses 
these questions, in the latter case through a summary of 
both Huawei’s historical development and its technology. 
1. U.S. in Latin America 
First, Latin America is close to the United States, 
geographically.  The U.S. is obviously physically bordered 
by Mexico and only a short trip away from the rest of Latin 
America.  Therefore, any security threat to Latin America 
presents a potential threat to the U.S. as well, based 
simply on proximity. 
Second, the U.S. also has a close economic 
relationship with many countries in Latin America.  
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Therefore, any relationship that strongly affects the 
economics of the region, also impacts the United States. 
Finally, the U.S. also considers many Latin American 
countries to be allies.  Not only are these countries 
allies, but the U.S. even maintains military bases in some 
of these countries.  Anytime there is a strong foreign 
influence in a country that the U.S. has a presence in, it 
should be an important matter to officials. 
Second, the U.S. also has a close economic 
relationship with many countries in Latin America.  
Therefore, any relationship which strongly affects the 
economics of the region, also impacts the United States. 
Finally, the U.S. also considers many Latin American 
countries to be allies.  Not only are these countries 
allies, but the U.S. even maintains military bases in some 
of these countries.  Anytime there is a strong foreign 
influence in a country that the U.S. has a presence in, it 
should be an important matter to officials. 
2. Huawei History 
For the subsequent analysis, it is necessary to 
understand Huawei.  One of the best ways to fully 
understand a company is to understand its history.  Huawei 
was established in 1987.  This means it was formed during 
the early generation of post-1978 Chinese companies 
established after Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy (Shao 
2012, para. 7).  For more than twenty-five years, Huawei 
has continued to expand, transforming into the global 
powerhouse that it is today. 
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However, Huawei did not begin with this type of 
strength.  “Huawei people, both managers and employees, 
used to work in a small office that also served as kitchen 
and dormitory” (Shao 2012, para. 8).  This shows Huawei’s 
will for success.  It takes great desire to persist through 
the tough beginnings and create the empire that is Huawei 
today. 
One of the most important aspects of the early stages 
of Huawei was its business relationships.  “Huawei’s 
business partner produced private branch exchange (PBX) 
switches as their main product offering” (Discovering 
Huawei's History 2012, under "A Historical Insight").  This 
partnership would be an important aspect of Huawei’s 
history.  After Huawei gained sufficient knowledge on the 
PBX business, it made a groundbreaking entrance into the 
mainstream telecommunications market in 1992, launching the 
C&C08 digital telephone switch (Discovering Huawei's 
History 2012, under "A Historical Insight").  This was the 
beginning of one of the most powerful telecommunications 
companies in the world. 
Much of this success must be credited to founder and 
president Ren Zhengfei.  A former member of the People’s 
Liberation Army Engineering Corps, Ren founded Huawei in 
1987 (Ren Zhengfei 2012, para. 1).  “In 1997, Ren visited a 
few U.S. multinational corporations, including IBM.  He 
later on mentioned his sentiment of the huge gaps between 
Chinese and Western companies” (Shao 2012, para. 9).  In 
1997, China could simply not compete with the U.S. in the 
technological field.  However, this trip would prove 
extremely valuable for Ren. 
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Ren knew that change was necessary, and he did 
everything he could to match U.S. companies.  “It engaged 
IBM, at a substantial cost, to be its technology-training 
provider. In total, Huawei spent over US$150 million on its 
transition” (Shao 2012, para. 11).  This is a huge 
commitment from a company with limited success at the time.  
Luckily for Ren, this investment has easily paid for itself 
over the years, as Huawei is now a model for success. 
3. Huawei Technology 
In order to truly understand the power of Huawei, it 
is important to take a closer look at the current 
technologies it manufactures.  “The company is now a 
$32billion business empire with 140,000 employees, and 
customers in 140 countries.  It commands respect by 
delivering high-quality telecoms equipment at low prices” 
("Who’s Afraid of Huawei?" 2012, para. 2). Huawei’s ability 
to provide this high-end equipment at low prices is one of 
the biggest reasons it has been so successful in its global 
expansion. 
In addition, Huawei is also a mass producer of 
infrastructure.  “Huawei’s sales have surpassed Ericsson’s, 
making the privately held company the largest telco 
infrastructure maker in the world” (Fitchard 2012, para. 
1).  Its ability to produce infrastructure worldwide is one 
of Huawei’s biggest strengths.   
Huawei’s primary business is selling high-end computer 
networking switches and other equipment used by cellphone 
carriers, Internet service providers, and other companies 
to run communications networks (Simonite 2012, para. 1).  
The purchases from these types of companies, in addition to 
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the multitude of personal devices purchased from Huawei, is 
a major reason for its success. 
One of the most important technological fields today 
is “big data.”  “In simplest terms, the phrase refers to 
the tools, processes and procedures allowing an 
organization to create, manipulate, and manage very large 
data sets and storage facilities” (Kusnetzky 2010, para. 
3).  Huawei is making significant progress in this field.   
“Huawei has added 1,000 research and development staff 
to bolster its storage team, Jiang said. Meanwhile, the 
company said a public cloud offering is currently in the 
works” (Hoffman 2012, para. 6).  This shows Huawei’s 
significant commitment to cloud computing and its 
associated technologies.  Cloud storage appears to be the 
way ahead in data-storage technology, and it is a must for 
any successful data-storage company.   
One of the newest Huawei products is Magnum.  “Magnum 
is a cloud-based integrated OSS/BSS system consisting of a 
software platform and customer service functionalities 
(including implementation and technical service)” (Morrison 
and Romaniuk n.d., under "Magnum OSS/BSS-The sweet taste of 
success").  This cloud-based system is one that Huawei 
hopes will assist in continuing its expansion in the global 
market.   
Huawei has also created what it calls the Noah’s Ark 
Lab.  Huawei’s “mission is to conduct the state of the art 
research on data mining and artificial intelligence by 
exploring theories and building intelligent systems” (Noah's 
Ark Lab n.d., para. 1).  This research lab is Huawei’s 
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means to help ensure that it remains one of the top 
companies in of the world of technology.   
Not only does Huawei offer cloud computing, it offers 
a mobile cloud as well.  “Cloud+ offers a range of next 





Phone finder, SNS, Contacts Integration and any where any 
device access for content saved on drive” (Cloud+ n.d., 
para. 1).  As the leading telecommunications company in the 
world, this technology is an important advancement.   
Finally, Huawei is currently pushing OceanStor HVS.  
“Huawei's HVS series uses Smart Matrix Architecture, and is 
equipped with XVE, a virtualized storage operating system 
dedicated to high-end storage systems” ("Huawei Cloud 
Congress 2012 Shows How Enterprises Can 'Make IT Simple, 
Make Business Agile' in the Cloud Era" 2012, para. 1).  
This is one of the most advanced storage systems available 
on the market today, showing Huawei is at the top of its 
field.   
In addition to advances in big data, Huawei has made 
great improvements in the mobile phone field.  Huawei’s 
mobile-chip company, MediaTek, recently “launched the 
world’s first quad-core ‘system on a chip’ for smartphones.  
The new chip, the MT6589, is cheaper to manufacture—which 
will help lower the price of smartphone hardware globally” 
(Muncaster 2012, para. 1).  If the price of these 
smartphones decreases, they will become increasingly 
popular worldwide, especially in the poorer countries in 
Latin America, where they are not as easily affordable.  
This growth would give Huawei even more power in the 
region. 
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Huawei has only recently entered the field of 
smartphone production.  “In 2012, Huawei has shipped 85 
percent of its devices under its own brand, compared to a 
scant 20 percent in 2011” (Dillet 2013, para. 1).  This 
sharp increase shows the potential for Huawei’s dominance 
in mobile devices.  “Chief Marketing Officer Shao Yang 
declared to Le Monde that the company plans to become one 
of the top 5 smartphone brands in 2014 and one of the top 3 
in 2016” (Dillet 2013, para. 2).   
While this seemed like a reasonable goal, Huawei 
has already exceeded these expectations, becoming the 
number three smartphone producer in the fourth quarter of 
2012.  “In 2012 overall, Huawei sold 27.2 million 
smartphones, up 73.8 percent from the year before” 
(Albanesius 2013, para. 2). 
Huawei has recently launched its first smartphone 
available to U.S. consumers, the Ascend P1.  “The Android-
powered device is equipped with a 4.3-inch Super AMOLED 
display, a 1.5GHz dual-core processor, 1GB of RAM and an 8-
megapixel rear camera” (Graziano 2013, para. 1).  This 
technologically advanced smartphone is available easily 
through Amazon or Best Buy.  While this was the first 
Huawei mobile device available in the U.S., there are 
already more available in stores.  This is a clear example 
of Huawei’s expansion into the United States.   
One of the key advantages that Huawei has over other 
companies lies in the production.  “Huawei manufactures its 
own phones.  Apple, Nokia, HTC, Motorola and others rely on 
third-party manufacturers like [Taiwan Manufacturer] 
Foxconn, which increases costs and reduces flexibility” 
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(Dillet 2013, para. 5).  This advantage of not having to 
rely on a third-party manufacturer makes Huawei’s success 
even more probable. 
It is clear from all of these technological 
advancements that Huawei is a formidable telecommunications 
company.  Examples of this are its big data technologies 
and advanced smartphones.  These products have allowed 
Huawei to expand all over the globe, gaining power as it 
grows.  One of the regions into which Huawei has expanded 
is Latin America.  This expansion has potential strategic 
implications for the United States, which shall be 
evaluated at this time. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In presenting this thesis, multiple problems came 
about.  The first problem was trying to get a solid grasp 
and understanding of Huawei Technologies.  Huawei has 
historically been a relatively opaque company.  It has 
recently been more open to the public, but its ownership 
structure remains clouded.  
Second, is the problem of establishing both U.S. and 
Chinese interests in Latin America.  In order to show the 
relevance of this thesis, it is important to show that not 
only is China interested in expanding in Latin America, but 
also, the United States cares about this expansion.  Once 
this is established, it is clearer whether Huawei’s 
expansion affects the U.S. or not. 
The third problem is that of separating suspicions and 
evidence.  Notably, there is less proof of Huawei posing a 
security threat than there are published suspicions.  In 
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order to properly identify the security threat of Huawei, 
it is necessary to show what evidence is presented and what 
evidence is missing. 
These problems are addressed in this thesis, making it 
clearer as to what type of threat Huawei’s expansion into 
Latin America poses to the United States.  The author finds 
positive support for the hypothesis that there is a 
significant security threat to both proprietary information 
and compromised communications equipment, presented even by 
the limited evidence against Huawei currently available, 
and that the U.S. should take action to limit Huawei’s 
expansion while also seeking further evidence to evaluate 
less substantiated claims. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This first chapter of this thesis has introduced the 
idea of Huawei’s expansion into Latin America.  It has 
highlighted the importance of this topic with a summary 
description of U.S. Latin American interests, and by 
examining the background of Huawei.  In order to do this 
properly, both the history of Huawei and its current 
available technologies were reviewed.  This review has 
shown that Huawei Technologies Inc. is a Chinese 
telecommunications company that is making tremendous 
economic gains worldwide.   
With this understanding of Huawei’s background, the 
next two chapters evaluate the strategic implications of 
its penetration into Latin America.  The second chapter 
focuses on the economic impact of Huawei’s expansion into 
Latin America.  In order to do this, both Chinese and 
American interests in Latin America are examined.  Next, 
the chapter describes Huawei’s presence, nature of 
contracts, and economic threat.  On this basis, the chapter 
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then evaluates whether Huawei’s penetration into Latin 
America is threatening to U.S. economic interests. 
The third chapter focuses on the security concerns 
that Huawei’s expansion poses.  These concerns are more 
difficult to identify.  The main reason for this is the 
lack of solid evidence supporting claims of Huawei’s 
illegal activities.  In order to manage this problem, this 
chapter presents all of the suspicions involving Huawei, 
and then distinguishes the evidence present to support 
those suspicions from the evidence that is missing.  This 
evaluation does not absolve Huawei of incrimination where 
evidence is lacking.  Rather, distinguishing concerns that 
are supported by evidence from those that are not will 
enable future inquiry to focus on where evidence is needed 
to validate concerns, supporting more nuanced policy-
making. 
The fourth and final chapter concludes by summarizing 
the findings of this thesis in previous chapters.  With the 
economic and security concerns of Huawei’s penetration into 
Latin America identified, the strategic implications for 
the U.S. can be evaluated.  This chapter shows that a clear 
link can be drawn between Huawei’s activity in Latin 
America and U.S. security.  In addition to summarizing the 
findings, recommendations for both future work and possible 
actions to be taken against Huawei are presented.  The 
chapter evaluates options that include limiting Huawei’s 
expansion, attaining more evidence to support such 
decisions, or simply allowing Huawei to continue its 
current trends.  Thesis recommendations are based on the 




II. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HUAWEI’S EXPANSION IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
A. U.S. INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
The first way to evaluate the strategic implications 
of Huawei’s expansion into Latin America is through 
America’s economic concerns.  In order to properly evaluate 
these concerns, U.S. economic interests in Latin America 
must be the first factor highlighted. 
The United States is one of the most dominant economic 
players in Latin America.  “U.S. geographic proximity to 
Latin America, close cultural ties, and long-standing trade 
patterns give the United States overwhelming advantages” 
(Engel 2008, para. 11).  This shows that Latin America is 
more than simply a trading ground to the United States.  
“We share historical, cultural, commercial, even familial 
ties” (Reich 2002, under "Introduction").  These bonds 
explain this close relationship that exists in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
One of the biggest reasons for the close relationship 
is politics.  Almost all Latin American countries now have 
democratic forms of government.  The Inter-American 
Democratic Charter makes the nations of this hemisphere and 
the Organization of American States (OAS) unique in the 
world because of our commitment to democracy (Reich 2002, 
under "Introduction").  This is one of the reasons for U.S. 
interests in Latin America.   
Since eight of the top ten U.S. trade partners have a 
democratic form of government (Iseman 2012, under table), 
it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. prefers to trade 
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with nations with democratic governments.  Not only does 
the U.S. prefer to deal with these nations, it wants to 
support democracy and help maintain internal stability.  
Mexico and Central America are examples of regions 
that depend economically on their exports to the United 
States more than anything else.  This relationship with 
Mexico is not just one-sided.  President George W. Bush was 
quoted as saying, “there is no relationship the world over 
that is more relevant to the United States than the one 
with Mexico” (Crandall and Hunter 2008, 242).  This 
statement clearly recognizes the importance of the U.S. 
relationship with Mexico.  
The United States also maintains very strong 
relationships in South America.  One example of that is the 
relationship with Chile.  “The main concern and orientation 
of Chile’s foreign policy has been toward creating and 
maintaining ties with the American superpower” (Moronde 
2003, 246).  Latin American countries, such as Chile, 
understand the importance of this relationship as much as 
the United States.  In fact, the U.S. sells more to the 
Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) 
than to China (Reich 2002, under "Introduction"). 
Even countries that the United States has had strained 
relationships with in the past still show signs of 
cooperation.  An example of this is Brazil.  Arturo 
Valenzuela, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of the 
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, has stated his desire 
for a strong relationship with Brazil.  Valenzuela claimed 
the U.S. government will work with American exporters and 
investors to expand trade in Brazil, and it will devote 
 13 
more resources to efforts that strengthen the bilateral 
mechanisms with Brazil, such as the Economic Partnership 
Dialogue (Valenzuela 2011, para. 27).  This shows the U.S. 
commitment to maintaining this relationship with Brazil. 
In addition, Brazil also supported the U.S. during its 
most difficult time.  “Brazil was the first country to show 
solidarity with the United States immediately following the 
September 11 attacks” (Crandall and Crandall 2008, 159).  
Brazil was not the only nation to join forces with the U.S. 
during this trying time.  “Thirty-two of the 34 OAS member 
states have also signed a hemispheric convention against 
terrorism to enhance regional cooperation in the fight 
against this scourge” (Reich 2002, under "The War on 
Terrorism").  These strong relationships that the United 
States maintains throughout most of Latin America are why 
it remains a regional power in Western Hemisphere. 
Another Latin American country that the U.S. has had a 
very difficult relationship with is Cuba.  However, this 
relationship has improved recently as well.  “During the 
first two years of the Obama Administration, we have taken 
measures to increase contact between separated families and 
to promote the free flow of information to, from, and 
within Cuba” (Valenzuela 2011, para. 14).  This is a huge 
change from the previous policies of travel restrictions.  
While the U.S. still opposes the communist government of 
Cuba, it is clear that it has reduced its tough stance on 
the country, allowing for a better relationship. 
B. CHINESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Since World War II, the United States has been one of, 
if not the only dominant player in Latin American affairs.  
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It has been argued by some observers that this is no longer 
the case, and that China has now emerged as a top external 
economic actor.   
In order to determine whether this is true, one must 
first examine the current relationship between China and 
Latin America.  This will be done by comparing each side’s 
motivations and the challenges faced by both parties.  
Finally, this relationship must be compared with the 
longstanding relationship Latin America has had with the 
United States. 
First, one must understand the motivations for the 
relationship between China and Latin America.  “Since April 
2000 when President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese 
official to visit the region, commercial ties between the 
two regions broadened and deepened” (Bruno 2012, para. 1).  
China has multiple reasons for getting involved in the 
Western Hemisphere.  The first, and most obvious, is trade.   
One of China’s main trade interests in Latin America 
is commodities.  “It has lifted growth for years in 
commodity producers such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and 
Peru with its voracious demand for raw goods such as iron 
ore, copper, and soy” (Grudgings and Gardner 2011, para. 
5).  This trade has given these countries a huge economic 
boost.  “Its purchases of commodities and raw materials 
from the region drive trade surpluses year after year.” 
(Roett and Paz 2008, 14).   
While these commodities and raw materials are some of 
the main reasons for involvement in Latin America, China’s 
interest in oil imports has increased as well.  “With 
Chinese domestic oil production declining, China’s 
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dependence on oil imports will inevitably increase” (Roett 
and Paz 2008, 18).  This has become apparent with the 
evolving relationship between China and Venezuela.  
Venezuela is a top-fifteen oil-producing country, exporting 
an estimated 2.5 million barrels of oil per day in 2011 
(Countries 2011, under "2011 World Oil Production").   
In addition to importing commodities and oil, China 
embraces its relationship with Latin America as a way to 
access new markets to export its manufactured goods.  China 
has had great success selling its products all over the 
world, often at a cheaper price than its competitors can 
provide.   
Since a large portion of the Latin American population 
consists of working-class citizens, these cheaper products 
can be very appealing.  This has led to a large increase in 
Chinese imports.  For example, in Brazil, “Imports from 
China increased by twice the rate of those originating in 
other countries (39 percent versus 18 percent)” (Rosales 
2012, under "Competition in Domestic Markets"). 
In addition to exporting its goods to Latin America, 
China is also interested in exporting its technologies.  
The Chinese government has voiced its intention to continue 
investing in infrastructure projects such as power plants, 
power grids and telecommunication facilities (Bruno 2012, 
para. 3).  This allows companies like Huawei to continue 
its expansion in Latin America.  Not only can Huawei sell 
its products, but it can build the infrastructure that 
supports its network.  
China is not alone in the desire to pursue this 
relationship.  Latin America also has a vested interest in 
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China.  Like China, the primary motivation for Latin 
America is trade.  “For the majority of governments in 
Latin America, the trade relationship with China has been a 
bonanza, producing much-needed trade surpluses” (Roett and 
Paz 2008, 17).  This economic boost has caused Latin 
America to pursue even more trade with China.  Trade 
between China and Latin America has increased about 30 
percent annually since 2001 to reach $241.5 billion in 2011 
(Li and Jianming 2012, para. 3). 
The other main motivation for Latin America is foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  “One recent example are 
agreements between Brazil and China on satellite 
development, in which China provided 70 percent of the 
financing and technology and Brazil the remaining 30 
percent” (Roett and Paz 2008, 18).  China has the ability 
to flood money into these countries seeking to benefit 
economically.  
As evidence of this, “over 12% of combined Chinese 
outward FDI (financial and non-financial) had gone to the 
economies of Latin America and the Caribbean as of late 
2009 (the region’s stock was US$ 31 billion)” (Rosales and 
Kuwayama 2012, 33). 
C. CHALLENGES FACED 
In its evolving relationship with China, Latin America 
has faced some challenges.  The flooding of the market with 
Chinese manufactured goods hinders industrial development 
in Mexico and Central American countries.  “Countries that 
rely on low-skilled, labor-intensive manufactured goods, in 
particular Mexico and Costa Rica, have suffered the worst 
effects” (Roett and Paz 2008, 17).  These Chinese goods are 
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hindering growth in their domestic markets, as well as 
taking away the U.S. market from these countries.   
An example of these challenges, Mexico filed a 
complaint to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this 
complaint, Mexico cited, “significant price undercutting, 
price suppression, price depression, and lost sales in the 
United States” (China — Measures Relating to the Production 
and Exportation of Apparel and Textile Products 2012, under 
"Complaint by Mexico").  While some countries are 
benefiting from Chinese involvement in Latin America, it 
has clearly had some negative effects as well. 
Francisco Gonzalez argues that the similarities in 
exports between China and Mexico are quite significant.  
The U.S. market export similarity index between China and 
Mexico rose continuously between the early 1970s and 2001, 
denoting more overlapped trade patterns and stronger 
competition (Gonzalez 2008, 149).  While this could have 
negative impacts on China, it is actually more harmful to 
the Mexican economy because of its inability to compete 
with Chinese prices.  Mexico relies on its trade with the 
U.S., and China’s presence in this market hinders the 
growth of Mexico’s economy.  
This relationship also has negative implications for 
the South American countries.  “The region will be 
vulnerable to the natural resource curse, in which foreign 
exchange earnings are obtained by the production of raw 
materials and commodities” (Roett and Paz 2008, 17).  This 
is a curse because commodities will not last forever, and 
they are completely dependent on the market.  “Latin 
America still faces the challenge of diversifying its 
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exports, moving beyond the raw commodities that China is so 
eager to buy, and further up the value-added scale” (Morris 
2011, para. 3).  While this is a challenge that must be 
addressed in the future, the trade between China and Latin 
America is still booming. 
D. HUAWEI IN LATIN AMERICA 
Huawei is a clear example of China’s desire to pursue 
its relationships in Latin America, as the company’s 
influence continues to grow in this region. 
In recent years, Huawei has increased its expansion in 
Latin America exponentially.  In fact, one of the most 
prominent forms of China’s expansion is in the 
telecommunications industry.  “Huawei now serves 50 
operators in Latin America…and has built networks in 13 
countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela” (How Huawei 
Advances 2008, 3).   
This expansion has made Huawei one of the most 
powerful telecommunications companies in the region.  
Huawei claims to rank first in Internet Protocol Digital 
Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (IP DSLAM) solution and 
Next Generation Networking (NGN) application in Latin 
America (Huawei Latin America Fact Sheet 2013, under "Latin 
America Operations").  As this field continues to grow, the 
profits from this investment will multiply as well.   
It is clear that this expansion is not simply a short-
term business venture.  “As further proof of its long-term 
interest in the region, Huawei has established training 
centers in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela” (How 
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Huawei Advances 2008, 3).  These training centers allow for 
the company to train its employees in Latin America, so 
they may operate at full potential in the region.  This 
commitment to the future will allow Huawei to stay ahead of 
its competitors in the advancement of technology.  This 
will ensure Huawei’s status as the top telecommunications 
company in Latin America. 
Brazil is one of the most significant regions in Latin 
America that Huawei has expanded.  Huawei opened its Latin 
American distribution center, in Sorocaba, in the Brazilian 
state of Sao Paulo, where it has invested US$60 million 
(Chinese Group Huawei Opens Latin American Distribution Hub 
in Brazil 2012, para. 1).  This investment has been seen 
through the deployment of 3G networks, the launching of 
Android phones, and the implementation of a Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS) (Huawei Latin 
America Fact Sheet 2013, under "Latin America Operations").  
It is clear that Huawei is making great technological 
advances in Brazil.  With Brazil being one of the fastest 
growing countries in the world, this is a natural place for 
investment from Huawei.   
An example of success in Brazil is already apparent, 
as Huawei was one of the companies selected by a Brazilian 
vendor as one of its preferred 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) 
equipment suppliers (TIM Brasil Picks NSN, Ericsson and 
Huawei to Deliver LTE 2012, para. 1).  This shows a 
commitment to a long-term relationship between Huawei and 
Brazil.  If Huawei continues to dominate competition in 
Latin America, it will continue to gain power and momentum 
in the region. 
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From the evidence shown, it is clear that Huawei is 
continuing to expand into the region’s most powerful 
country of Brazil.  However, Huawei is also expanding into 
the smaller, less developed countries, such as Trinidad & 
Tobago.  Huawei was selected to upgrade the largest 
telecommunications company’s mobile network and make it 4G 
compatible (Coalition: Cracks Growing 2012, 7).   
Huawei introduced its fourth generation BTS (Base 
Transceiver Station) in this WiMAX network, which includes 
cutting-edge features like 4T4R (4 transmitters and 4 
receivers) and MIMO (multi-input multi-output) (TSTT to 
Bridge Digital Divide in Trinidad and Tobago with Huawei's 
WiMAX Solution 2010, par 3).  These advanced technologies 
are some of the reasons why Huawei is so popular in Latin 
America. 
While it makes sense to invest in more developed 
regions because of the wealth available, it can also be 
beneficial to operate in a region with little competition.  
Trinidad & Tobago is a perfect example of this.  Huawei can 
volunteer to build the infrastructure, as well as sell the 
mobile devices, which appeals to both the host country and 
telecommunications supplier. 
Huawei also has significant ties with countries that 
the U.S. has had diplomatic disagreements with in the past.  
Venezuela's telecoms minister and the head of Telecom 
Venezuela met with Chinese counterparts and signed fresh 
partnership agreements with Huawei in 2007 (Anderson 2007, 
para. 5).  This is not only an example of Huawei’s 
continued expansion in the region, but also an example of 
Huawei’s ties to U.S. adversaries.   
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While this may seem insignificant, there is a 
potential cause for concern.  In 2011, Venezuelan diplomats 
were reportedly involved in planned cyberattacks against 
U.S. targets, including nuclear power plants (Smithson 
2011, para. 1).  Huawei could possess the technology needed 
to conduct these attacks successfully.  Therefore, this is 
a relationship that should be monitored by concerned U.S. 
officials. 
Another adversary that Huawei has had a relationship 
is Cuba.  Huawei was consulted on projects such as the 
construction of an undersea cable between Venezuela and 
Cuba (Anderson 2007, para. 6).  Until recently, there were 
too many restrictions for U.S. telecommunications companies 
to operate in Cuba.  This was an opportunity for investment 
that Huawei was able to seize.   
However, that may soon change.  “Under the new policy, 
U.S. telecommunications providers will be able to establish 
fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications 
facilities linking the U.S. and Cuba” (Condon 2009, para. 
3).  This may provide some competition for Huawei in Cuba, 
but Huawei has the clear of advantage, having dealt with 
Cuba in the past. 
Not only is Huawei expanding in countries that the 
U.S. considers adversaries, it is also expanding in Mexico, 
which the U.S. considers to be a close ally.  Winning over 
customers helped Huawei’s Mexico unit more than double 
sales to $440 million in 2010; from about $200 million in 
2009 (Huawei’s $30 Billion China Credit Opens Doors in 
Brazil, Mexico 2011, under "Market Gains").   
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While Mexico is America’s closest ally in the region, 
it is also an immediate neighbor to the south.  This shows 
the economic power that Huawei has just outside of U.S. 
borders.  This is a significant amount of money that U.S. 
telecommunications companies are potentially losing out on 
because of Huawei’s presence in Mexico. 
Huawei has also recently launched Mexico’s first LTE 
network.  “Huawei's LTE services will cover nine Mexican 
cities, with plans to expand to 26 markets until the first 
quarter of 2013 to reach 65% of the country's population” 
(Rial 2012, para. 4).  This is clear evidence of Huawei’s 
expansion in Mexico.  Since much of the country is rural, 
65% is a significant amount of the country to provide LTE 
services.  This will allow for Huawei’s continued power in 
Mexico. 
While it may seem as if Huawei is dominating 
technologies markets in Latin America, U.S. companies are 
not always willing to take the risk of a relationship in 
adversarial countries.  Reportedly, “in May Costa Rica’s 
government invited some of the world’s biggest equipment 
manufacturers to build a sophisticated new mobile-telecoms 
network in the Central American country.  Only Huawei 
stepped forward” (How Huawei Advances 2008, 3).   
In cases like this, American companies had a chance to 
bid for the contract, but they declined.  This shows that 
one of the reasons for Huawei’s economic success in Latin 
America is the lack of U.S. investment in the region.  If 
U.S. companies want to profit from Latin America, they need 
to be more aggressive in instances like this in Costa Rica. 
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In addition, Huawei’s relationship with Costa Rica was 
soured over a difference in pricing.  “Huawei had wanted to 
charge US$583m for the construction of 1.5m 3G lines—more 
than double the government’s US$225m budget for the 
project” (How Huawei Advances 2008, 3).  This damaged 
relationship left an opportunity for a U.S. company to step 
in and compete for the contract.  Once again, this did not 
occur, leaving Huawei to negotiate a new deal.   
While it appears that U.S. telecommunications 
companies may be disinterested in investing in Latin 
America, there is another possibility.  These companies may 
fear that they cannot match Huawei’s pricing, due to unfair 
practices.  The European Union (EU) has accused Huawei of 
exactly this.   
The EU has said that Huawei is inflicting damage on 
European producers by dumping products onto the European 
market at rock-bottom prices and selling equipment for 
wireless networks at least 35% below what it calls fair 
market prices (Dalton 2012, para. 3).  U.S. companies can 
infer that it will be very similar in Latin America.  This 
may be one reason that these companies hesitate to even 
attempt to compete with Huawei in the region. 
There are multiple reasons why Huawei is so successful 
in expanding into areas like Latin America.  One reason is 
the support it receives from the Chinese government.  
“Huawei continues to receive tax privileges and state-
sponsored credit from Beijing, thanks to its designation as 
a ‘national champion’ of new technology” (How Huawei 
Advances 2008, 3).  This relationship allows Huawei to 
spend more money in its pursuit of global expansion.  This 
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gives Huawei a great advantage over U.S. telecommunications 
companies, which are not sponsored by the government. 
Another reason for Huawei’s success in Latin America 
is the cheap labor it can provide.  “China’s vast, cheap 
labour force has allowed the company to offer products and 
services at a 20–30% discount to most of its competitors” 
(How Huawei Advances 2008, 3).  This is an advantage that 
Chinese companies like Huawei have all over the world.  
However, it is even more relevant in Latin America, where 
much of the population lives in poverty.   
This is an enormous advantage to have over U.S. 
companies, who can’t compete with Huawei’s prices.  This is 
the case in most products, not simply telecommunications.  
It is a major hurdle faced by the U.S., and it still has no 
proven answer to the advantage cheap labor. 
 This economic advantage has specifically increased 
Huawei’s expansion in Argentina.  “In Argentina…when most 
foreign firms were retreating after the country’s 2001/2 
economic collapse, Huawei redoubled its efforts to 
penetrate the market” (How Huawei Advances 2008, 3).  This 
shows not only Huawei’s economic prowess, but its 
intelligence, as it invested in a target when all others 
backed out.  This was another case in which U.S. companies 
had the opportunity to invest, but they opted not to, 
leaving the door open for Huawei. 
One of the other major reasons for Huawei’s success is 
technology.  As mentioned earlier, Huawei is one of the 
leaders in mobile communications technology.  However, 
Huawei is also ahead of its competition in providing this 
technology to the rural areas of Latin America.  “With a 
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market share of 67%, it remains the world’s number-one 
producer of equipment using CDMA technology in the 450MHz 
band, which is popular in rural areas” (How Huawei Advances 
2008, 3).   
Rural telephony is an enormous advantage in a region 
like Latin America, where much of the region is made up of 
rural areas.  Huawei was clearly looking to the future when 
they developed this technology.  While other companies were 
focusing on the obvious need for communication in the large 
urban areas, Huawei took the less obvious route.  This is 
clearly paying off already, and will likely continue to do 
so in the future, as other countries will be attempting to 
catch up. 
It is clear that Huawei has made significant progress 
in its penetration of Latin America.  It has done this 
through expanding into both economically powerful and poor 
countries.  Examples of this were seen with Brazil and 
Trinidad and Tobago.  Huawei has also struck deals with 
both U.S. adversaries, as well as allies.  This was shown 
with the examples of Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico.  Finally, 
Huawei has expanded in countries that the U.S. opted not to 
pursue a relationship with.  This was seen in both Costa 
Rica and Argentina. 
There are multiple reasons why Huawei has been so 
successful in this region of the world.  The first reason 
is its technology.  As one of the world leaders in 
telecommunications, Huawei is clearly a top choice for some 
of these nations.  Another reason that Huawei has been 
successful is the cheap labor it can provide.  U.S. 
companies simply cannot match the prices that Huawei can 
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offer.  Finally, Huawei has penetrated countries because of 
the unwillingness of U.S. companies to invest.  Whether 
this is because of the financial risk, or the political 
risk, the result is the same.  Huawei is clearly gaining 
economic power in Latin America. 
Now that it is clear that Huawei has gained economic 
power in Latin America, it is important to evaluate the 
strategic implications this has for the United States.  The 
U.S. is clearly losing out on the potential 
telecommunications trade market in Latin America.  While 
U.S. companies may wish this was not the case, it might be 
an obstacle that is very difficult to overcome. 
As Huawei is the most powerful telecommunications 
company in Latin America, it has clearly dominated 
competition, particularly with U.S. companies in the 
region.  As these countries in Latin America continue to 
work with the China-based Huawei, they may increase other 
forms of trade with China.  This could limit the U.S. trade 
growth with these countries.  As a nation’s economic well-
being is one of the key elements of security, this 
relationship does have negative implications for the United 
States.  However, there are some ways in which the U.S. 
could mitigate this problem and limit the effects.  
First, Huawei is the leading telecommunications 
infrastructure producer in the world.  It will be difficult 
for any U.S. company to convince a country in Latin America 
that it can provide cheaper service than Huawei.  If these 
companies want to compete in the region, they must first 
improve their technologies with research and development. 
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Second, U.S. companies will always struggle to compete 
with Chinese companies receiving government subsidies from 
Beijing.  Huawei’s cheap labor may be an insurmountable 
obstacle.  The best option to deal with this issue is 
pursue legal options.  If it can be proven that Huawei is 
using unfair trade practices, it may be forced to raise its 
prices by the WTO, creating a more fair market. 
Finally, for U.S. companies to be more competitive in 
Latin America, they will have to take more risks and invest 
in these countries.  Huawei will continue to win contracts 
in the region, as long as there are no other competitors.  
This includes countries that the U.S. has hesitated in 
dealing with in the past, such as Venezuela and Cuba. 
E. HUAWEI IN THE U.S. 
In addition to expansion in Latin America, Huawei is 
also expanding in the United States.  There are already a 
number of Huawei products available in the United States.  
Huawei entered the U.S. in 2007.  Since then, it has been 
steadily building relationships with carriers, adding 
devices like smartphones, hot spots, and even a tablet 
(Dolcourt 2012, para. 6).   
Best Buy, one of the most popular telecommunications 
technology providers in the U.S., currently carries four 
Huawei smartphones (Best Buy 2013, under "Mobile Phones").  
While Huawei may not yet be a household name in the United 
States, it is definitely trending in that direction.  With 
its advancements in technology and ability to provide cheap 
labor, Huawei will have clear advantages over U.S. 
companies if it continues to expand. 
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Huawei seems to be following the trend of other 
Chinese companies that continue to invest in the U.S.  
“Chinese direct investment in the United States is 
soaring…Businesses from China have established operations 
and created jobs in at least 35 of the 50 U.S. states” 
(Rosen and Hanemann 2011, 8).   
Huawei’s increase in products available in the U.S. 
shows that it too will follow this trend, and continue its 
expansion in the United States.  This expansion has the 
potential to hurt U.S. companies economically, as they will 
likely be unable to compete with Huawei’s prices. 
The United States presents a logical option for 
Huawei’s continued expansion.  “After big successes in 
Africa, Latin America, and the Asia Pacific region, Huawei 
needs to find more room to expand.  The U.S. holds obvious 
appeal” (Wohlsen 2012, para. 4).  This appeal is due to the 
extensive amount of money spent on telecommunications each 
year.  “The converging sectors of broadband, media and 
information technology add nearly $900 billion annually to 
the U.S. economy” (Broadband Industry Stats 2013, para. 2).   
If Huawei does pursue expansion in the U.S., this 
should be alarming to other telecommunications companies, 
as they may struggle to compete.  Huawei has the strength 
needed to have a huge impact on the market.  “They bring a 
good financial position.  They can create products.  
They’ve got a huge R&D capability.  So they could be strong 
competitors” (Wohlsen 2012, para. 5).  This ability to 
compete with U.S. companies makes Huawei’s expansion even 
more probable.   
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Another country that has concerns about Huawei is 
Canada, who has taken a similar approach to the U.S. with 
Chinese investment in their country.  The Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS) recently warned against the 
Chinese bid for the energy company, Nexen.  “They do not 
want to wake up one day and realize a crucial sector of the 
economy is under the control of foreign interests” 
(Ljunggren 2012, para. 3).  This philosophy shows the 
growing global skepticism surrounding Chinese supported 
companies, like Huawei.   
While this warning did not stop the Chinese bid for 
Nexen, it did make it much more difficult for them to 
acquire it.  This could possibly deter both Chinese and 
Canadian companies from making similar deals with each 
other in the future.  This is similar to the current 
strategy that the U.S. government has employed.  Strict 
warnings against dealing with companies like Huawei have 
deterred some U.S. companies, but it might not continue to 
do so in the future.   
Europe is another place where concerns over Huawei are 
growing.  The European Commission has echoed similar 
statements to those made by U.S. officials about suspected 
Chinese government influence over Huawei.  It believes “the 
Chinese government is subsidising it to allow Huawei to 
displace its competitors in European markets by 
artificially lowering the prices of its products” (Huawei 
Working with GCHQ to Quell Espionage Fears 2012, para. 3).  
This shows that the U.S. is not alone in its suspicion of 
Huawei.  This global controversy is an example of another 
economic concern that Huawei presents. 
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III. SECURITY CONCERNS SURROUNDING HUAWEI’S 
EXPANSION IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although trade and common bonds are big reasons for 
U.S. interests in Latin America, another concern is 
security.  “In the United States, we also know that we will 
not be safe at home unless our neighborhood is safe, so 
promoting security in the region is our first priority” 
(Reich 2002, under "Security").  In this case, promoting 
security could mean keeping out potentially harmful 
adversaries. 
Chapter II showed that there are many economic reasons 
why Huawei could be considered a potential threat to the 
United States.  It is now important to evaluate whether or 
not Huawei presents a security threat to the U.S. beyond 
the economic threat.  In order to properly perform this 
evaluation, one must look at several factors.   
The first factor is the many suspicions surrounding 
Huawei.  Once all of the suspicions have been laid out, it 
is important to evaluate the evidence presented.  Some 
suspicions are backed up by evidence, while in other cases, 
the evidence is lacking.  One of the most important 
documents, which can show the evidence, or lack thereof, is 
the Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security 
Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei 
and ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Company 
Limited.   
Once it is clear what solid evidence exists, it will 
be important to look at the circumstantial evidence, which 
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is not ideal, but can provide support to some of the 
suspicions.  Finally, it is crucial to examine what 
evidence is needed in order to provide proof for the claims 
made against Huawei.  
B. SUSPICIONS REGARDING HUAWEI 
1. Espionage 
While Huawei has purportedly been very successful at 
illegally using its equipment and access to collect 
information, it has been surrounded by controversy.  In 
recent years, the most glaring controversy in the U.S. is 
the suspicion of espionage.  In February 2011, Huawei wrote 
a letter to the United States to address these concerns.  
“We sincerely hope that the United States government will 
carry out a formal investigation on any concerns it may 
have about Huawei” (Hu 2011, 5).   
The U.S. accepted this invitation.  The House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence initiated this 
investigation in November 2011 to inquire into the 
counterintelligence and security threat posed by Chinese 
telecommunications companies doing business in the United 
States (Rogers and Ruppersberger 2012, iv). 
One of the main focuses of the investigation was the 
suspicion of espionage.  “Chinese actors are the world’s 
most active and persistent perpetrators of economic 
espionage” (Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in 
Cyberspace 2011, 5).  These concerns about China led to 
similar suspicions of Huawei.  The Committee spent a 
significant amount of time looking into these suspicions, 
and the connections between Huawei and the Chinese 
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government made up a large part of the investigative 
report. 
There are many ways in which a telecommunications 
company could conduct espionage.  One way that this could 
be conducted is through the insertion of foreign devices 
into its telecommunications equipment.  Malicious hardware 
or software could allow the Chinese government to shut down 
or degrade critical national security systems in a time of 
crisis (Rogers and Ruppersberger 2012, 3).  This is one of 
the biggest reasons that officials do not want Huawei to 
expand into the Latin America or the U.S. 
In addition to inserting hardware and software, Huawei 
could also use its personnel to conduct espionage.  An 
example of this would be inserting a spy into Huawei’s team 
of engineers.  “To identify and resolve the issues, they 
will gain full access to network architecture and design - 
a security risk for network reconnaissance” (Ferro 2012, 
under "The security risk is the team of engineers").  This 
would be the case in any country in which Huawei installed 
the infrastructure.   
If Huawei was to conduct such an operation, this would 
allow for easy reconnaissance.  “As an attacker, knowing 
weak points, physical locations, logical layouts, what the 
target response plan is, and what equipment is all just 
marvellous intelligence” (Ferro 2012, under "What Security 
Actions are Possible").  All of these could potentially be 
gained by someone posing as an engineer or support 
technician.  These are threats that should be concerning to 
nations hosting Huawei infrastructure in Latin America. 
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Not only is Latin America close to the United States 
geographically, but the U.S. maintains close relations with 
many of these countries.  In addition, the U.S. military 
conducts operations in Latin America.  The U.S. operates 
over twenty military bases throughout Latin America 
(Whitney Jr. 2012, para. 1).  An attack on the 
infrastructure there could have serious impact on military 
communications. 
2. Intellectual Property Infringement 
In addition to Huawei’s possible connections with the 
government, they have also been accused of intellectual 
property infringement.  In February 2003 Cisco Systems, 
sued Huawei Technologies for allegedly infringing on its 
patents and illegally copying source code used in its 
routers and switches (Baxter 2003, under "Cisco's Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction").  This accusation shows a lack 
of trust in Huawei from U.S. companies. 
More recently, in January 2013, the United States 
International Trade Commission launched a new patent probe 
against Huawei.  This probe will investigate InterDigital’s 
complaints of patent violation on its 3G and 4G devices 
(Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities 
and Components Thereof 2013, para. 1).  This shows that 
there are similar suspicions surround Huawei in the U.S. 
ten years after the accusations were launched by Cisco.  
This pattern of potentially illegal activity is one of the 
reasons the U.S. is very cautious when dealing with Huawei. 
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3. Relationship with Iran 
In addition to potential cyber espionage and 
intellectual property infringement, the U.S. is suspicious 
of Huawei’s relationship with Iran.  Iran has been labeled 
a threat by the United States due to its rogue government 
and pursuit of nuclear weapons.  Huawei is suspected in 
assisting the Iranian government with several technological 
projects.  One example is a project in which Huawei was 
suspected of assisting the Iranian police in tracking 
people’s cell phones.   
This is not the only concerning link between Huawei 
and Iran.  Huawei is also suspected of selling American 
antenna equipment to Iran.  This is contrary to prior 
statements from Huawei, stating that it would abide by U.S. 
embargoes set against Iran.  If true, these suspicions 
would clearly show a violation of these embargoes. 
Huawei is not the only Chinese company suspected of 
selling U.S. equipment to Iran.  China's ZTE Corp is 
suspected of selling U.S. computer gear to an Iranian 
telecommunications firm.  While Huawei is the focus of this 
case study, confirming these suspicions would show that 
Iran is clearly using these Chinese telecommunications 
companies to acquire U.S. equipment, which could 
potentially be used against the U.S. in a future conflict.   
One of the companies voicing these suspicions is 
Hewlett-Packard (HP). They addressed the suspicion of these 
embargoes.  "HP's distribution contract terms prohibit the 
sale of HP products into Iran and require compliance with 
U.S. and other applicable export laws” (Stecklow, "Huawei 
Partner Offered Embargoed HP Gear to Iran" 2012, para. 7). 
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If Huawei is not abiding by the same regulations as 
American companies, it should be taken into account when 
evaluating the threat that Huawei presents. 
4. Other Global Suspicions 
In addition to the allegations the U.S. has brought 
against Huawei, the telecommunications company has faced 
controversies all over the world.  One such controversy was 
in Algeria, where two Huawei officers were accused of 
bribery and corruption.  This would show not only the 
illegal activity conducted by representatives of Huawei in 
Africa, but the potential to perform similar actions in 
Latin America.    
In addition, the European Commission shares similar 
security concerns as the U.S.  “They have also voiced 
concerns that in case of open war, the Chinese government 
might use its influence over Huawei to disable the 
company's equipment built into infrastructure across the 
world” (Huawei Working with GCHQ to Quell Espionage Fears 
2012, para. 3).   
This could leave China’s adversaries vulnerable and 
without communication capabilities.  This possibility is 
concerning for both the U.S. and countries in Europe that 
foresee any type of conflict with China in the future. 
Finally, Huawei has recently been linked to the death 
of an American engineer in Singapore.  “Shane Todd, the 
engineer, headed a team at the Institute of 
Microelectronics (IME) that worked on the development of 
gallium nitride, a substance that can be used in both 
commercial and military applications” (Spolar and Bonner 
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2013, para. 2).  The suspicions surrounding this case imply 
that Huawei was interested in gallium nitride for military 
purposes.  This association with the death, as well as the 
research of gallium nitride should be concerning to U.S. 
officials. 
C. EVIDENCE OF ESPIONAGE 
1. Evidence Presented 
After an extensive review of current documents, it is 
clear that there is no solid evidence supporting claims of 
Huawei’s espionage.  While there may be strong suspicions, 
lack of evidence to the contrary, and circumstantial 
evidence, there is currently no proof that Huawei is 
performing espionage.  This is certainly not due to a lack 
of effort to find such evidence.  Either Huawei is not 
conducting such acts, or it is very successful at covering 
up its activities. 
2. Evidence Missing 
In order to properly prove the suspicions of 
espionage, someone must provide some form of evidence 
against Huawei.  Since none has been found to date, any 
type of proof would lend some validity to the accusations.  
This evidence could come in many different forms.   
One type of evidence that is missing is physical 
evidence.  If some type of espionage tool was discovered in 
a piece of Huawei hardware or software, this would 
certainly validate these suspicions.  However, nobody has 
found anything of the sort in past investigations.   
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A second type of evidence that is missing is 
documentation.  There are no documents that have been found 
linking Huawei to espionage.  An example of a valuable 
document would be one linking Huawei to the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), showing that it was performing 
espionage missions that were assisting the PLA.   
A third potential type of evidence would be a 
statement from an insider.  No current or former employees 
of Huawei have admitted to conducting espionage for the 
company.  A statement from a Huawei or Chinese government 
employee that linked Huawei to espionage could potentially 
be the lead needed to find solid evidence.   
Until one of these types of evidence is discovered, it 
will be difficult to validate claims of Huawei conducting 
espionage.  Without this proof, it may be hard to limit 
Huawei’s continued global expansion. 
D. EVIDENCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT 
1. Evidence Presented 
In the 2003 case of Cisco’s claim against Huawei for 
patent infringement, there is significantly more evidence 
supporting the claim.  “Huawei admitted that some of the 
code used in its products came from an outside and 
unauthorized source” (Reardon 2003, para. 2).  This 
admission forced Huawei to change all of its products in 
order to comply, leaving its claim to innocence on the 
subject unbelievable.  This is an example of much stronger 
evidence presented against Huawei. 
In the 2013 United States International Trade 
Commission probe, the outcome is still pending.  
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Unfortunately, there is very little evidence related to 
this case available to the public at this time.   
2. Evidence Missing 
From the evidence presented, it is clear that Huawei 
was guilty of intellectual property infringement against 
Cisco, in 2003.  No further evidence is needed, since 
Huawei admitted guilt and was forced to change its products 
to comply with the court.  However, this is a case from ten 
years ago, and it does not prove that Huawei is still 
conducting patent infringement against other companies. 
In order to prove that Huawei is still guilty of this 
type of activity, the current case, launched by the 
International Trade Commission, needs to provide similar 
evidence.  If this evidence does exist, it will present a 
clear threat to U.S. companies. 
E. EVIDENCE OF AN INAPPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN 
1. Evidence Presented 
Huawei is suspected of making multiple deals with 
Iranian companies and government agencies.  The first 
suspicion was installing the tracking capability.  
According to sources, “Huawei recently signed a contract to 
install equipment for a system at Iran's largest mobile-
phone operator that allows police to track people based on 
the locations of their cellphones” (Stecklow, Fassihi and 
Chao 2011, 3).   
This shows not only a partnership with a U.S. 
adversary, but also the capability to track its customers’ 
cellphones.  While this is not an uncommon 
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telecommunications capability, sharing this technology with 
Iran could potentially be a security concern, as tensions 
between the U.S. and Iran remain high. 
In addition to being able to track the location of the 
phones, Huawei also provided another significant 
capability, “supporting the special requirements from 
security agencies to monitor in real time the communication 
traffic between subscribers” (Stecklow, How Foreign Firms 
Tried to Sell Spy Gear to Iran 2012, para. 7).  This 
capability is much more concerning, giving some credence to 
the suspicion of Chinese espionage.  While this is not 
evidence of Huawei spying on customers, it shows that they 
not only have the capability, but they are willing to share 
that capability with Iran. 
The second suspicion was that of Huawei selling U.S. 
antenna equipment to Iran.  Documents obtained by 
international news agency Reuters show that an Iranian 
partner of Huawei Technologies, a company that has denied 
breaking U.S. sanctions, tried to sell embargoed American 
antenna equipment to an Iranian firm (Stecklow, Huawei 
Partner Offered U.S. Tech to Iran 2012, para. 1).  This 
shows a very suspicious relationship between Huawei and 
Iran.   
This willingness to violate U.S. sanctions with Iran 
presents a potential security threat.  Huawei could avoid 
other U.S. laws in the future or even assist Iran in future 
operations against the United States. 
In addition to Huawei, ZTE was also suspected of 
providing U.S. equipment to Iran.  According to sources, 
China's ZTE Corp had sold or agreed to sell millions of 
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dollars worth of U.S. computer gear to Telecommunication 
Co. of Iran, the country's largest telecommunications firm 
(Stecklow, Huawei Partner Offered U.S. Tech to Iran 2012, 
para. 10). 
While these contracts and documents have not been made 
publicly available, the sources are considered reliable.  
This is a significant amount of evidence linking Huawei 
with Iran.  It also shows Huawei’s unwillingness to abide 
by U.S. embargoes set against Iran, which it claimed it 
would follow.  This evidence shows a possible security 
risk. 
2. Evidence Missing 
While it has been stated that these contracts and 
documents exist, it would be more convincing to the public 
if they were readily available for anyone to read.  This is 
a simple solution that would lead to a stronger case 
against Huawei. 
In addition to providing the documentation to support 
claims against Huawei’s relationship with Iran, it would 
also help to provide evidence of intent.  While it is clear 
that Huawei has made deals with Iran, there is no proof 
that either side has malicious intent against the United 
States.  If one could prove that the sale of the cellphone 
tracking technology, U.S. antenna equipment, or U.S. 
computer gear were intended to cause harm to the U.S., this 
would be sufficient evidence of Huawei’s security threat. 
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F. EVIDENCE OF OTHER GLOBAL CONTROVERSIES 
1. Evidence Presented 
In the case of Algeria, the two Huawei officers were 
sentenced to 10 years in prison for bribery and corruption 
in Algeria, but have since been whisked away from Algeria 
to China, and Huawei has refused to return them to face the 
law (Dowuona 2012, para. 14).  This shows not only the 
illegal activity conducted by representatives of Huawei, 
but also Huawei’s powerful connection with the Chinese 
government.   
One of the reasons this particular case is concerning 
is the many parallels between China’s penetration into 
Africa and their expansion in Latin America.  Both Africa 
and Latin America are made up of many regions with a lot of 
poverty.  Huawei saw these regions as a potential for 
expansion, offering to build the infrastructure at a low 
cost for their telecommunications networks.  This parallel 
shows that these problems in Algeria could very easily 
happen in Latin America as well. 
In the case of the death of Shane Todd, there is some 
evidence linking Todd to Huawei.  High quality global 
journalism requires investment.  “Mr Todd’s parents said 
they found among his possessions an external hard drive 
that contained work files—including one, labelled “Huawei”, 
that appears to be a plan between IME and Huawei for the 
development of gallium nitride” (Spolar and Bonner 2013, 
para. 3). This evidence supports the claim that Huawei was 
working with Todd on this matter. 
In addition to the suspicion of developing gallium 
nitride for military purposes, Huawei is also suspected in 
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the death of Shane Todd.  “Mr Todd’s parents, Rick and Mary 
Todd of Montana, have said that their son told them 
frequently in 2012 that he was worried that he was 
compromising US national security with his work on a 
project at IME that involved a Chinese company” (Spolar and 
Bonner 2013, para. 11). These statements from the family 
make Huawei a viable suspect in the case of Todd’s death. 
2. Evidence Missing 
While the case in Algeria clearly shows illegal 
activity conducted by Huawei, the European Commission has 
not presented any proof of Huawei’s plans to disable 
infrastructure in foreign countries.  Like the U.S. 
Committee, GCHQ has not provided evidence that Huawei has 
these plans in mind.  However, if this were the case, it 
could leave China’s adversaries vulnerable and without 
communication capabilities.  Even though there is little 
evidence, the mere possibility is concerning for both the 
U.S. and countries in Europe that foresee any type of 
conflict with China in the future. 
In order to justify further legal action against 
Huawei, there needs to be more evidence presented.  One 
form of evidence would be to show a pattern of illegal 
activity, like in Algeria.  If this was shown to be a 
common theme, rather than a single occurrence, it would 
give more leverage to the argument against Huawei’s 
expansion. 
Another form of evidence would be proof of the 
European Commission’s fears of Huawei disabling its 
equipment built into infrastructure around the world during 
a war.  First, there would need to be proof that this task 
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is possible.  Once that is determined, the amount of 
influence that the Chinese government has over Huawei would 
need to be evaluated.  Finally, proof of this intent would 
need to be presented.  Not only have they not all been 
presented, but none of these forms of evidence have been 
presented by GCHQ. 
The last global controversy was the death of Shane 
Todd.  While the discovered hard drive linked Huawei to 
Todd and gallium nitride, there is little evidence proving 
what intent there was in this development.  In order to 
prove that this was for military purposes, some 
documentation of this intent must be provided. 
In the case of Todd’s death, it is clear that his 
family suspects Huawei of foul play.  However, this is the 
only proof available at this time.  In order to prove 
wrongdoing, it will be important that the Singapore police 
investigate the matter further, providing a motive and 
physical evidence to support the family’s claims.  
G. HPSCI INVESTIGATION 
In November 2011, the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence launched an investigation to accommodate 
Huawei’s request.  While Huawei requested this 
investigation, the Committee found the company less than 
cooperative.  “Huawei, in particular, failed to provide 
thorough information about its corporate structure, 
history, ownership, operations, financial arrangements, or 
management” (Rogers and Ruppersberger 2012, v).  This 
ambiguity raised further concerns regarding Huawei during 
the investigation. 
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This investigation did not provide an overwhelming 
amount of evidence against Huawei, with no evidence of 
cyber espionage.  However, during the investigation, Huawei 
was not fully cooperative with the Committee.  They claimed 
to have no knowledge of Chinese laws that force them to 
comply with the Chinese government’s requests for access to 
their equipment (Rogers and Ruppersberger 2012, 10).  The 
Committee found this claim to be unbelievable.  According 
to Rogers and Ruppersberger, Huawei was also very vague and 
incomplete in answering most questions that were presented.  
This lack of cooperation only added to the Committee’s 
suspicions of the company. 
While no evidence of Huawei conducting espionage was 
discovered, the Committee attempted to draw a link between 
Huawei and the Chinese government, the Communist party, and 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  The Committee did find 
documentation of “Huawei employees showing that Huawei 
provides special network services to an entity the employee 
believes to be an elite cyber-warfare unit within the PLA” 
(Rogers and Ruppersberger 2012, 34).  The report cites an 
internal Huawei email, but does not provide the actual 
email.  This is the closest that the Committee came to 
providing evidence of Huawei conducting cyber espionage. 
While the link between Huawei and the PLA was limited 
in terms of evidence, the Committee was successful in 
discovering another area of concern.  “The Intelligence 
Committee's investigation into the security of Huawei's 
router software reportedly found it ‘riddled with holes,’ 
many of which could potentially be exploited by hackers” 
(McAllister 2012, under "Bugs, Just Not the Spying Kind").  
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While this was not the main focus of the investigation, it 
was an important finding.   
It is unknown whether these software vulnerabilities 
are intentional or accidental.  If they are intentional, 
Huawei could be leaving backdoors in the software in order 
to access the routers in the future.  This would be a clear 
reason to distrust Huawei and its equipment.  If the 
vulnerabilities are accidental, it is simply sloppy coding, 
which is also a risk that the U.S. should not be willing to 
take with its computer equipment.  Either way, it is clear 
that further investigation needs to be done on the subject 
in order to produce more evidence. 
While many would assume that Huawei would deny these 
vulnerabilities, this was not the case.  “A move to engage 
one of its biggest critics is a significant shift in 
Huawei's approach to dealing with the issue, indicating the 
security concerns may not be entirely baseless” (Alo 2012).  
If there was no legitimacy to these security concerns, 
Huawei would continue to ignore the criticism it receives.  
This shows that Huawei’s routers are indeed vulnerable, but 
there is still no evidence to support malicious intent. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
From the previous examples, it is clear that Huawei is a 
company that is surrounded by much controversy, and its 
penetration into Latin America should be viewed with much 
caution.  These controversies include both economic and 
security concerns.  There are many claims and accusations 
presented against Huawei, and each of these suspicions is 
supported by varying amounts of evidence. 
The first argument that was presented was that Huawei’s 
penetration into Latin America presents an economic threat to 
the United States.  The evidence presented shows that Huawei 
is already the leading telecommunications company in Latin 
America.  The evidence also shows that U.S. companies are 
losing out on potential business in the region, whether by 
being under bid by Huawei or choosing to not work on specific 
contracts.   
There are two major reasons for this.  The first is that 
U.S. companies are not taking the same risk with investment 
in Latin America.  The only solution for this problem is for 
American companies to take more risks in the region.  The 
second reason is the ability of Huawei to use cheap labor to 
keep its prices low.  The only way for the U.S. to counter 
this is to prove unfair trade practices, forcing Huawei to 
raise its prices. 
The second strategic implication of Huawei’s penetration 
into Latin America is the security concern.  The arguments 
presented show that there are many accusations that have been 
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launched against Huawei.  However, there is not always 
evidence provided to support such allegations. 
The first suspicion of Huawei that was presented was 
that of espionage.  While this is a very serious 
allegation, with tremendous repercussions for the United 
States, very little evidence exists thus far to support 
validate these suspicions.  Therefore, at this time, it is 
hard to consider Huawei a viable threat to national 
security.  At the same time, little evidence presently 
exists to absolve Huawei either.  Vigilant observation is 
merited. 
The second suspicion was that of stealing intellectual 
property.  This is a threat that was not only supported by 
evidence, but there was a pattern presented, as Huawei as 
now been accused of similar activity just this year.  This 
is a viable threat to the economic security of U.S. or 
Latin American companies, whose patents may be at risk.  In 
addition, it shows the willingness of Huawei to conduct 
illegal activities, implying a possible willingness to 
partake in other illegal actions. 
The third accusation dealt with Huawei’s relationship 
with Iran.  Evidence was presented showing a clear 
relationship between Huawei and Iran, but the extent of 
this relationship is still unclear.  It is clear that 
Huawei has violated U.S. embargoes against Iran, but it is 
not clear if there is malicious intent, or if this is 
simply an economic move.  However, the trade of technology 
shows the capability, now shared by Huawei and Iran, 
presents a threat on its own. 
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Finally, while these threats were being investigated, 
it was also revealed that Huawei products contained code 
vulnerabilities, leading to a lack of security  (McAllister 
2012, under "Bugs, just not the spying kind").  This is an 
equally concerning threat, as it leaves customers, whether 
from the U.S. or Latin America, at risk to cyber-attacks.  
There was no evidence provided suggesting that these were 
intentional holes left in the equipment, but the threat is 
no less significant to the users. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While there was some evidence to support accusations 
launched against Huawei, many claims still require 
supporting evidence.  Therefore, if the U.S. wishes to 
continue these accusations, pursuit of this evidence is 
necessary.  Otherwise, U.S. officials will not be able to 
advocate for limiting Huawei’s expansion into Latin 
America. 
First, U.S. officials need to produce evidence of 
espionage.  This can be done through Huawei’s hardware and 
software, or through documents linking it to conducting 
espionage for the PLA or Chinese government.  If this type 
of evidence cannot be found, it is recommended that these 
claims no longer be made, as it is difficult to support, 
and the lack of evidence could cause the public to be 
skeptical of any Huawei wrongdoing. 
Second, further proof of stealing intellectual 
property would support claims against allowing Huawei’s 
continued expansion.  If the current case pending against 
Huawei proves that it is still violating patents, this will 
be enough evidence to support these claims. 
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Third, further investigation into Huawei’s 
relationship with Iran is required to prove a possible 
security threat.  It is recommended that U.S. officials 
look for proof of Huawei’s malicious intent, showing it 
knowingly sold U.S. equipment to Iran to harm the United 
States.  This evidence will convince authorities that 
Huawei is not a company that should be trusted by U.S. 
companies. 
If the previous examples of evidence are found, it 
will be clear that Huawei’s expansion is a threat to U.S. 
security.  If this evidence is not produced, it will be 
hard for the U.S. to convince civilian companies not to 
work with Huawei.  However, it should not be difficult to 
keep government agencies from using Huawei products.  Even 
without further evidence, the current findings show that 
Huawei should not be trusted to be used for government 
purposes.   
C. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
(DOD) 
This research benefits the DOD by raising questions 
regarding the penetration of Huawei into the Latin American 
telecommunications infrastructure.  The research presented 
shows the necessity for further investigation into Huawei.  
There may be limited evidence; however, the serious 
accusations discussed earlier indicate a potential security 
threat to the U.S. presented by Huawei.    
The most concerning accusation against Huawei is that 
the company has built the ability for Huawei, rather than 
the nation owning the infrastructure, to shut down the 
infrastructure during a time of war.  This should be of 
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great concern in the case of Latin America, where the 
United States conducts many military operations.  As 
Huawei’s penetration into Latin America increases, military 
communications could be forced to travel on a Huawei-based 
infrastructure.  If this infrastructure could be shut down 
through an intentional backdoor, it could leave U.S. 
military operations extremely vulnerable. 
In addition, Huawei’s relationship with Iran should 
concern the DOD.  If Huawei is selling American equipment 
to Iran with malicious intent, this is clearly a threat to 
U.S. security.  This matter should be investigated further 
and appropriate actions taken. 
These accusations show why the DOD should be concerned 
about Huawei’s continued expansion.  If there is truth to 
the accusations, Huawei’s presence in Latin America is a 
threat to U.S. security because of America’s close 
relationship and military presence in the region.  These 
concerns will be further amplified for the DOD if Huawei 
continues its expansion in the United States.  This is why 
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